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EXPANDING WORLD
COMMERCIALIZATION: THE
LINK BETWEEN WORLDSYSTEMS AND CIVILIZATIONS
Stephen K. Sanderson
From the rise of the first states around 5,000 years ago until the last
few hundred years, the dominant form of social organization has been the
agrarian state, or what Collins (1990, 1992) has called agrarian-coercive
societies, Kautsky (1982) traditional aristocratic empires, and Marxistoriented scholars the tributary mode of production (Amin 1976; Wolf 1982).
Regardless of their various differences, agrarian societies share at least four
fundamental characteristics. First, they are characterized by a class division
between a small landowning (or at least land controlling) nobility and a large
peasantry. The peasantry is compelled on threat of violence to pay tribute
in the form of rent, taxation, labor services, or some combination thereof to
the nobility for the latter's economic benefit. This relationship is one of
naked exploitation backed by military force. Second, the noble-peasant
relationship is the principal economic axis in the society, and it is a
relationship of production-for-use rather than production-for-exchange.
Production-for-exchange exists to some degree, but it is subordinate in
importance, often greatly so, to production-for-use. Indeed, the social actors
who dominate production-for-use, the urban merchants, were typically
looked down upon by the aristocracy as money-grubbing individuals who
dared to dirty their hands with the soil of commerce. Merchants sometimes
enjoyed great wealth, but their social status was almost invariably low. Third,
despite the class division between nobles and peasants, there is no overt class
struggle carried on between these two classes (Kautsky 1982; Giddens 1985).
There is, of course, a marked contlict of class interest, but this does not
manifest itself, other than in the most minimal and sporadic way, in deliberate
actions by one class against the other. Finally, agrarian societies are held
together not by any sort of ideological consensus or common world-outlook,
but by military force (Giddens 1985). Agrarian societies are virtually always
highly militarized societies, and such militarization is essential to the aims
and ambitions of dominant groups. Military might is devoted to the twin
aims of internal repression and external conquest.
Agrarian societies have been most intensively studied by historians,
and especially by those historians who think of themselves as
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"civilizationists," many of whom claim allegiance to the works of Arnold
Toynbee (1934-61) and Pitirim Sorokin (1957). Civilizationists can be
identified by a number of characteristics, but two stand out. First, they exhibit
a tendency to think of the agrarian civilizations in a mentalist or idealist
sense. Civilizations are defined and bounded by their cultural themes or
motifs, which include such things as philosophies, art styles, religions, and
other abstract systems of thought and feeling. Civilizationists have paid some
attention to the political features and dynamics of agrarian societies, but they
have given little attention to the economic side and certainly have not given
it any prominent role in civilizational dynamics. Second, unlike most
historians, civilizationists have searched for patterns or regulari ties in history,
the patterns identified usually being cyclical in nature. Thus we have
Toynbee's notion that all civilizations tend to go through a life cycle
containing four stages - genesis, growth, breakdown, and disintegrationand Sorokin's famous idea that civilizations exhibit a cyclical alternation
between ideational, idealistic, and sensate forms. In contrast to most
historians, civilizationists have therefore adopted a nomothetic rather than
an idiographic stance. Nevertheless, the cyclical nature of their nomothetic
view has seemingly excluded from consideration the type of linear
developmental patterns stressed by those other students of agrarian societies
(and all other types of societies), viz., social scientists who espouse an
evolutionary view of history.
I would like to suggest that civilizationists need to pay more attention
to economics and to developmental rather than cyclical patterns. (I am not
rejecting the notion that there may be cyclical patterns, but only asserting
that there are developmental or evolutionary patterns of profound
importance.) In recent years a number of social scientists have begun to
study agrarian and other types of preindustrial societies from a very different
point of view, one that does in fact emphasize both economics and longterm social development. These are scholars who identify with the
world-system perspective originally developed in the 1970s by Immanuel
Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1980, 1989). The success of this perspective in
interpreting the nature and dynamics of modern capitalist civilization has
led to the notion that it may have more general utility - that there may have
been other historical world-systems that can only be properly understood
from a holistic point of view rather than by considering the parts of the
system in relative isolation. The pioneers of this view have been, inter alia,
Jane Schneider (1977), Kajsa Ekholm and Jonathan Friedman (1982), Janet
Abu-Lughod (1989), Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1991,
1993), and Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills (Frank 1990, 1991; Gil1s
and Frank 1991, 1992), some of whom have contributed articles to this issue.
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My initial reaction to the attempt to apply a world-system perspective to
precapitalist and preindustrial societies was rather mixed (Sanderson 1991).
One of my initial objections concerned the attempt to apply a perspective
focusing on relations of economic exchange to societies in which productionfor-exchange was clearly subordinated to production-for-use. My argument
was that precapitalist societies, agrarian societies included, contained so little
production-for-exchange that it would be difficult to apply a world-system
perspective to them. Or, to the extent that such a perspective could be applied,
it would apply to only a tiny portion of economic action, and thus be of very
limited use. However, I had an open mind and continued to read and study
the works of the "precapitalist world-systemites," hoping that a payoff would
eventually be realized.
I did not have long to wait. I gradually came to accept the view, argued
most forcefully by Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills, that agrarian
civilizations had much more commercialism in them than had generally been
recognized, and that in fact there had been a long-term process of the growth
of commercialism beginning around 3000 B.C. Frank and Gills have referred
to this process as one of capital accumulation and have suggested that the
rise of modern capitalism after the sixteenth century was only a quantitative
extension of the process, not aqualitative shift from a "feudal" to a "capitalist"
economy. I break with them on this particular point - it seems to me a
considerable overstatement - but I regard their argument for the gradual
growth of commercialism over the last 5,000 years as basically sound. Since
I see this process prior to A.D. 1500 as having occurred within essentially
noncapitalist, tributary societies, I prefer to refer to it as one of expanding
world commercialization rather than capital accumulation. Before A.D. 1500
the growth of commercialism occurred within societies in which early forms
of capitalism (perhaps best called "protocapitalism") existed, but capitalist
relations were not yet dominant in the economy. For me, expanding world
commercialization is a historical process of tremendous significance that we
are only perhaps now coming to appreciate, and it is the link (or if not the
link, then at least a link) between the concerns of traditional civilizationists
and the new precapitalist world-systemites. This is, or at least can be, a
common focus for both groups of scholars.
As I see it, the process of expanding world commercialization is one
that can be assessed primarily in terms of growth in the size and density of
trade networks. Some trade existed prior to the rise of the first civilizations
in 3000 B.C., but its scale began to increase substantially after that date.
Early trade was primarily local or confined to relatively small regions, but
in due time it expanded to include much larger regions, and then eventually
true long-distance trade emerged to link East with West. It is possible to
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mark off three major stages in this process (McNeill 1982; Curtin 1984).
The first stage begins around 2000 B.C. and ends around 200 B.C. During
this phase trade was largely local or, at best, regional in scope. By 200 B.C.
there emerged the first truly long-distance trade with the estahlishment of a
trade axis that ran all the way from China to the Mediterranean. After about
A.D. 1000 there was another big leap forward in which trade networks
expanded and deepened, especially in the period he tween 1250 and 1350.
It is interesting to note that the emergence of a long-distance trade axis
after 200 B.C. corresponds fairly closely to Rein Taagepera's date for a
sudden surge in the size of agrarian empires (600 B.C.). Taagepera (1978,
1990) has studied changes in the size of agrarian empires over approximately
the last 5,000 years. He shows that there has been a significant increase in
empire size during this time and marks off three phases of empire growth.
The first phase begins with the rise of the state itself. Before this time there
were no political units with a size greater than 0.1 square megameters (one
square megameter = 386,000 square miles). During the first phase of empire
building the single largest agrarian empire seemed to maintain a size of at
least 0.15 square megameters and to have at least occasionally attained a
size of about 1.3 square megameters. A second phase of empire building
was inaugurated around 600 B.C. After this time the single largest empire
was never smaller than 2.3 square megameters, and the maximum imperial
size attained was 24 square megameters. Obviously, then, there is a
substantial increase in the size of empires after 600 B.C. Taagepera believes
that the increase in empire size during the second phase prohably resulted
from increasing sophistication in the art of power delegation, especially
through impersonal bureaucratic roles rather than personal relationships. But
it is also likely that the size increase was made possible hy important
developments in the areas of transportation and communication. as Taagepera
himself notes. Empires could not become effectively larger until the means
were available for controlling and integrating much larger areas. Expanding
world commercialization and the growth of empires are undouhtedly causally
related, for as E.L. Jones (1988) has argued, truly long-distance trade
networks only became possible with the rise of very large empires. Only
empires of that size had developed the technology of communication and
transportation needed to facilitate worldwide trade.
Philip Curtin (1984) has described some of the basic characteristics of
the worldwide trade network that was in effect between 200 H.C. and A.D.
1000 (cf. Chaudhuri 1985). As he notes, during this period trade became
regularized between the Red SeaiPersian Gulf region and India, between
India and Southeast Asia, and between Southeast Asia and both China and
Japan. In the middle Han period, Chinese merchants traveled to the west
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through central Asia and established an overland trade route between East
Asia and Europe. Chinese trade with India had become extensive by the first
century A.D., and Chinese goods were being sold widely in the Roman
Empire. During Roman times trade between India and the Mediterranean
was carried on through three different routes: an overland route through
Parthia, the Persian Gulf combined with an overland route, and the Red Sea
combined with an overland route to Egypt or some part of the Fertile Crescent
region. Maritime trade flourished in the South China Sea and the Bay of
Bengal, with Canton being an important port for trade to the south.
William McNeill (1982) has described what he regards as a new and
major burst of world commercialization beginning around A.D. 1000, and
centering heavily on China. It was during this time that China had by far its
greatest burst of economic acti vity prior to modern times, one that lags behind
only late medieval Europe and Tokugawa Japan in scale and scope. Mark
Elvin (1973) has referred to this as an "economic revolution," most of which
occurred during the period of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960-1275). Elvin sees
the Sung economic revolution as involving agriculture, water transport,
money and credit, industry, and trade (both domestic and foreign). He argues
that improvements in agriculture gave China by the thirteenth century the
most sophisticated agricultural system in the world, and one that provided
a foundation for major thrusts in commercial activity. Commercial activity
was also greatly aided by improvements in water transport. These
improvements involved both the construction of better sailing vessels on the
one hand and the building of canals and removal of natural obstacles to
navigation in streams and rivers on the other. Industry flourished, especially
the production of steel and iron. The economy became much more monetized.
There was a much greater volume of money in circulation, and the money
economy even penetrated into peasant villages. Foreign trade, especially
with Southeast Asia and Japan, flourished. Markets proliferated and became
hierarchically organized. At this time China was the world's most
economically advanced society, and many observers have suggested that it
was on the brink of the world's first industrial revolution. However, beginning
sometime in the fourteenth century China began to decline and stagnate
economically and gradually to withdraw from foreign trade. It became
increasingly isolated and inward looking, a process that had become fairly
complete by the middle of the fifteenth century. The reasons for this economic
downturn are still very imperfectly understood today.
McNeill sees the enormous economic growth in Sung China as part of
a larger picture of world commercialization. As he says, "China's rapid
evolution towards market-regulated behavior in the centuries on either side
of the year 1000 tipped a critical balance in world history" (1982:25). And
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he elaborates (1982:50-54):
Though the capitalist spirit was ... kept firmly under control,
the rise of a massive market economy in China during the eleventh
century may have sufficed to change the world balance between
command and market behavior in a critically significant way.
Moreover, the growth of the Chinese economy and society wa<; felt
beyond China's borders; and as Chinese technical secrets spread
abroad, new possibilities opened in other parts of the Old World, most
conspicuously in western Europe ....
What seems certain is that the scale of trade through the southern
seas grew persistently and systematically from 1000 onwards, despite
innumerable temporary setbacks and local disasters. Behavior attuned
to the maintenance of such trade became morc and more firmly
embedded in everyday routines of human life ...
What was new in the eleventh century, therefore, was not the
principle of market articulation of human effort across long distances,
but the scale on which this kind of behavior began to affect human
lives. New wealth arising among a hundred million Chinese began to
flow out across the seas (and significantly along caravan routes as
well) and added new vigor and scope to market related activity. Scores,
hundreds, and perhaps thousands of vessels began to sail from port to
port within the Sea of Japan and the South China Sea, the Indonesian
Archipelago and the Indian Ocean ....
As is well known, a similar upsurge of commercial activity took
place in the eleventh century in the Mediterranean, where the principal
carriers were Italian merchants sailing from Venice, Genoa, and other
ports. They in turn brought most of peninsular Europe into a more
and more closely articulated trade net in the course of the next three
hundred years. It was a notable achievement, but only a small part of
the larger phenomenon, which, [ believe, raised market regulated
behavior to a scale and significance for civilized peoples that had
never been attained before ....
[t was precisely in the eleventh century, when China's
conversion to cash exchanges went into high gear, that European
seamen and traders made the Mediterranean a miniature replica of
what was probably happening simultaneously in the southern oceans .
. . . These separate sea networks were then combined into one single
interacting whole after 1291.

Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) has picked up the story where McNeill left
it. She describes in great detail for the period 1250-1350 the structure and
operation of a vast worldwide trade network from western Europe to East
Asia. This huge network contained eight overlapping subsystems that can
be grouped into three larger circuits centering on western Europe, the Middle
East, and the Far East. She claims that this world trade network (1989:353)
was substantially more complex in organization, greater in
volume, and more sophisticated in execution, than anything the world
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had previously known.
Sophistication was evident in the technology of shipping and
navigation, the social organization of production and marketing, and
the institutional arrangements for conducting business, such as
partnerships, mechanisms for pooling capital, and techniques for
monetization and exchange.

Additional corroboration for the notion of expanding world
commercialization throughout the agrarian era comes from research on trends
in world urbanization. Using data compiled by Tertius Chandler (1987),
David Wilkinson (1992, 1993) has shown that urbanization is a striking trend
in world history. Of course, commercialization and urbanization cannot be
strictly equated, but it is likely that urbanization is more a function of
increasing commercialization than of anything else. Cities may grow and
expand to fulfill important political functions, of course, and certainly for
various other reasons, but commercialization seems to be the main driving
force behind urbanization (Bairoch 1988).
The accompanying table presents data on world urbanization trends
from 22S0 B.C. to A.D. ISOO.1t is clear that urbanization has been a striking
feature of agrarian social growth over a period of nearly 4,000 years. A
particularly large leap in urbanization occurs in the period between 6S0 and
430 B.C. During this period the number of cities of 30,000 or more inhabitants
increased from 20 to SI , and the total population represented by these cities
increased from 894,000 to 2,877 ,000, a more than threefold increase. It seems
very noteworthy that this period marks the early beginnings of Greco-Roman
civilization and is the same period that Taagepera has identified as being
associated with a major increase in the size and scope of political empires.
There is another major urbanization spurt between 430 B.C. and A.D. 100,
during which the number of cities of 30,000 or more inhabitants increased
from SI to at least 7S, and also during which the total population of these
cities expanded from 2,877,000 to S; 181,000, an 80 percent increase. This
period is essentially the same period that McNeill and Curtin refer to as
involving the emergence of the first truly long-distance trade network
between East Asia and the Mediterranean.
It cannot escape attention that world urbanization suffered a setback
between AD. 100 and A.D. SOO. There were fewer large cities (those with
30,000-40,000 or more inhabitants), and the total population of these cities
fell from S,I81,000 to 3,892,000. This was, of course, the period of the
decline and eventual collapse of the Roman Empire. However, world
urbanization and commercialization suffered only a minimal and quite
temporary setback. By A.D. 800, the total population of the largest cities
(S,237,000) had regained the level achieved in A.D. 100. It took longer for
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World Urbanization, 2250 BC - AD 1500
Estimated
No. largest
Pop. range of
tot. pop. of
Civilintions
Year __________________________
cities
largest
cities __~~~
largest__cities
~~
~~~~
~______re~p~re.s~en~t~e~d_____
2250 BC

8

c.30,000

240,000

Mesopotamian,
Egyptian

1600 BC

13

24,000-100,000

459,000

Mesopotamian,
Egyptian,
Aegean

1200 BC

16

24,000-50,000

499,000

Central,' Aegean,
Indic, Far
Eastern

650 BC

20

30,000-120,000

894,000

Central, Aegean,
Indic, Far
Eastern

430 BC

51

30,000-200,000

2,877,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern

AD 100

75*

30,000-450,000

5,181,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern

AD 500

47

40,000-400,000

3,892,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern

AD 800

56

40,000-700,000

5,237,000

Central, Indic,
West African,
Far Eastern,
Indonesian,
Japanese

AD 1000

70

40,000-450,000

5,629,000

Central, Indic,
Far Eastern,
IndoneSian,
Japanese

AD 1300

75*

40,000-432,000

6,224,000

Central, Indic,
West African,
Far Eastern,
Japanese,
Indonesian

AD 1500

75*

45,000-672,000

7,454,000

Central,lndic,
West African,
Far Eastern,
Japanese
'Central civilization is Wilkinson's name for the expanded civilization originally centered
on Mesopotamia and Egypt. By 200 BC it had engulfed Europe.
An asterisk denotes the upper limit on the number of cities set by Chandler (1987).

Sources: David Wilkinson, "Cities, Civilizations, and Oikumemes: 1." Comparative
Civilizations Review 27:51-87, 1<)'.12; and "Cities, Civilizations, and Oikumemes: II."
Comparative Civilizations Review 28:41-72, 1993. Tertius Chandler, Four Thowand Years of
Urhan Growth. Lewiston, NY: St. David's University Press, 1987.
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the number of large cities to return to the level reached in A.D. 100 - there
were 70 such cities in A.D. 1000 and 75 or more cities in A.D. 1300 - but
not that much longer. Moreover, after A.D. 1000 the scale of world
urbanization was clearly very large and continuing to grow, and, as already
noted, the period after A.D. 1000 has been seen by McNeill and Curtin as
involving another major leap in world trade networks.
What are the implications of recognizing a historical process of
expanding world commercialization over the period from 3000 B.C. to A.D.
1500? I see at least two. First, this process requires strong qualification of
what has long been the standard sociological wisdom on agrarian societies:
that they exhi bited thousands of years of lethargy and stagnation and had no
impetus to fundamental social change. This is a view that dates all the way
back to the eighteenth century. Its proponents have included Max Weber
([ 189611909] 1976), Gerhard Lenski (1970), John Kautsky (1982), and
Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), among many others. It is not completely
erroneous, but it is one-sided and misleading. While agrarian societies have
generally lacked any strong evolutionary impetus - any tendency toward
fundamental structural transformation into a new form of society - it is
clear that agrarian societies in A.D. 1500 were different - some might even
say profoundly different - from what they were like in 3000 B.C.
We might put the matter this way. A useful distinction can be drawn
between social growth and social evolution. Social growth occurs when there
is a quantitative change in one or more dimensions of a system of social
organization. Increases in, say, the size of a population, military might,
technological efficiency, or political power may be regarded as social growth
so long as they do not lead a society into a structurally new mode of
organization. This is essentially a distinction between quantitative change
(social growth) and qualitative change (social evolution), or between
something new rather than something greater. The crucial question is, of
course, Was there much social evolution during the so-called agrarian era?
The answer is no, there was not. But there was considerable social growth.
In addition to expanding world commercialization this included two
correlative forms of social growth: growth in the size of political empires
and in the concentration of political power (Taagepera 1978, 1990; Mann
1986), and technological advance (Lenski 1970; Mann 1986). However, I
believe that the growth of commercialism was the most important form of
social growth during the long agrarian epoch.
The second implication of acknowledging a process of expanding world
commercialization is perhaps even more important. Assuming that the
movement out of the stage of agrarian society was going to be a movement
into a specifically capitalist system of social and economic life - and
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historically, of course, this is the way things have worked out - it needs to
be stressed that the emergence of capitalism could not be some sort of sudden
leap forward to be achieved in a few dozen or even a few hundred years. It
was an economic transformation that required a long period of time because
of what might be called the "threshold effect." Because of capitalism's
requirement for extensive markets (both foreign and domestic), and because
of the general hostility of agrarian elites to it, it could only emerge slowly,
and as such would require a lengthy period of incubation before it could
reach a kind of "critical mass" essential to a tipping of the balance of economic
power in its favor. In retrospect we know that the time period actually required
was approximately 4,500 years from the beginning of the first agrarian states.
In another work (Sanderson 1994) I have attempted to develop this
implication at some length by way of formulating a new theory of the rise
of modern capitalism.
In conclusion, I feel compelled to say that this essay is only a bare
beginning toward understanding the worldwide growth of commercialism
over the past 5,000 years. This process cries out for understanding in much
greater detail, and many important questions remain to be answered. What
was the extent to which earlier forms of capitalism were "rationalized" in
the Weberian sense? Were ancient merchants profit maximizers? What was
the importance of financial arrangements in earlier forms of capitalism?
What was the relationship between technological advance and commercial
expansion? What role did the state play in ancient capitalism? Now that we
have begun to recognize that there was an important long-term process of
expanding world commercialization, these questions and many others await
civilizationists, worId-systemitcs, and all other inquisitive parties.
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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